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Abstract 
 
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services and its Annex on Financial 
Services provide the international legal framework for the regulation of cross-border 
trade in financial services.  This paper analyses some of the main provisions of the 
GATS and the Annex on Financial Services to determine its impact on domestic 
financial regulation and whether the GATS framework can achieve its objectives of 
liberalising international trade in financial services while allowing states to maintain 
adequate domestic regulatory institutions.  The paper argues that the GATS provides a 
flexible framework for states to negotiate liberalisation commitments while allowing 
sufficient domestic regulatory authority to achieve financial stability objectives.  The 
extent to which states can depart from their GATS obligations to achieve regulatory 
objectives has become the source of academic debate and policy interest. Although 
the WTO has played little or no role in the financial regulation debate, the GATS 
contains certain disciplines that could potentially have significant implications for 
limiting regulatory discretion over financial markets.  The papers suggests that the 
Doha Development Agenda should address some of these issues as they relate to the 
regulation of cross-border trade in financial services.  The role of the WTO in this 
area raises important issues regarding the institutional design of financial regulation 
and related issues of global financial governance.      
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THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVVICES AND THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN TRADE LIBERALISATION AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION     
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This paper analyses some of the main issues with respect to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) and its application to cross-border trade in financial 
services and domestic regulation of financial markets.
1
   The paper argues that the 
GATS provides a set of flexible rules for member states to negotiate specific 
liberalization commitments in most sectors of services trade based on the principles of 
national treatment, market access and transparency.  As a general matter, the GATS 
does not attempt to regulate the content and scope of domestic regulation, but rather 
merely seeks to ensure that a WTO member’s domestic regulation does not pose 
unnecessary barriers to cross-border trade in services.  In financial services, state 
regulatory autonomy is reinforced by the GATS Annex on Financial Services which 
provides member states broad discretion to take regulatory measures for prudential 
reasons that may have the effect of restricting cross-border trade in financial services.  
This so-called prudential-carve-out has become the source of some concern because it 
allows states considerable regulatory discretion and policy autonomy to adopt and 
implement prudential regulations that may have the effect of restricting or curtailing 
cross-border trade in financial services and related capital flows.
2
  
 
As a preliminary matter, however, it should be noted that the GATS has had little, 
if any, impact on standard setting in financial regulation.  Prudential standard setting 
has been the subject of negotiations mainly amongst developed countries in various 
international financial standard setting bodies (eg., the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions).  Legally, 
the adoption and implementation of prudential regulation is the responsibility of 
national authorities.  Moreover, GATS jurisdiction does not generally extend to a 
state’s regulation of capital flows (except in narrow circumstances discussed below) 
and therefore has limited impact on issues related to systemic risk and financial 
stability.  Nevertheless, the GATS contains certain disciplines that have the potential 
to influence some areas of domestic financial regulation.  For instance, where states 
have made specific liberalisation commitments under GATS, Article VI requires 
states to ensure that regulatory measures are applied in a reasonable, objective and 
impartial manner, and are based on transparent criteria and not more burdensome than 
necessary to ensure the quality of the service.
3
  The content and scope of domestic 
                                                 
1 See generally, World Trade Organization (1999) The Legal Texts – The Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
2 The Annex on Financial Services contains what many observers call the ‘prudential carve-out’ that 
allows WTO members to take regulatory measures that may limit cross-border trade in financial 
services if such measures are taken ‘for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, 
or to ensure the integrity or stability of the financial system’. As discussed below, the relevant WTO 
Committees have so far not attempted to interpret the scope of the ‘prudential exception’, and it has not 
been subject to dispute resolution. 
3 Art VI: 1 & 4 (a) & (b). 
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regulation, however, remains under the discretion of state regulatory authorities.
4
  It is 
only in areas where states have derogated from specific commitments to liberalise 
listed sectors that they can be called to account for breach of a GATS commitment.  
To date, no WTO member state has convened a panel to hear a complaint against 
another member for adopting financial regulatory measures that allegedly violate a 
GATS commitment.     
      
The paper argues that the flexible institutional design of the GATS allows WTO 
member to adopt liberalisation commitments that fit their particular economic 
circumstances while maintaining adequate domestic regulatory controls and provides 
states wide discretion to depart from their specific market access and national 
treatment commitments if they are doing so for a prudential reason.  The GATS does 
not prescribe the content of prudential regulatory controls.  The absence of a 
definition within the WTO of prudential regulation has raised some concerns 
regarding the potential for a state’s prudential regulatory controls to have 
discriminatory effect on foreign financial services providers in violation of GATS 
commitments and disciplines.  The paper argues that the WTO is not an appropriate 
forum for establishing international standards of prudential regulation and that it 
should develop further institutional linkages with other International Financial 
Institutions (eg., IMF) to determine the extent and scope of prudential regulation.   
 
Moreover, the paper considers the role of WTO dispute resolution in resolving 
conflicts over interpretations of domestic financial regulation.  The paper argues that 
the ad hoc nature of WTO dispute resolution is not well-equipped to balance the 
competing interests between trade liberalisation and regulation of financial markets.  
The paper therefore argues that the WTO Council for Trade in Services and 
Committee on Trade in Financial Services should facilitate negotiations to address 
these issues with a view to deciding parameters for defining and/or recognising 
standards of prudential regulation and the extent to which they can limit, or be limited 
by, GATS obligations and commitments.   
 
The paper’s overall objective is to examine the relevant principles of the 
GATS that influence the domestic regulation of financial markets.  Part I discusses the 
origins of the GATT and World Trade Organization.  Part II addresses the 
negotiations surrounding the adoption of the 1997 Financial Services Agreement 
(Fifth Protocol to the GATS).  Part III analyses the relevant provisions of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and how it regulates trade in financial 
services.  Particular emphasis shall be placed on the specific legal obligations of WTO 
members to provide national treatment and market access to services suppliers of 
other WTO members.  It also examines the GATS Annex on Financial Services to 
ascertain the extent to which GATS trade liberalization principles are qualified by the 
right of members to adopt regulatory controls for prudential reasons.  In this way, the 
GATS and the Annex on Financial Services allow states to adopt regulations for 
financial stability reasons that may have the effect of allowing states to depart from 
                                                 
4 As discussed below, the GATS and its Annex on Financial Services provides WTO members with 
broad discretion to take regulatory measures and/or adopt policies that derogate from specific GATS 
commitments if the measures are taken for ‘prudential reasons’ or ‘to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order’ or to prevent ‘deceptive and fraudulent practices’.  Para, 2A, Annex on 
Financial Services (containing prudential reasons exception) and GATS, Art XIV: (a)-(c) (protecting 
public morals and public order and prohibiting fraudulent practices).   
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their GATS commitments.  In the case of conflicting objectives between prudential 
regulation and trade liberalization, this section discusses how the Annex creates a 
mechanism that allows WTO members to provide mutual recognition of other 
prudential arrangements, which could potentially lead to increased harmonization and 
convergence of prudential standards within the GATS framework.  The section 
suggests, however, that this mechanism for harmonization and convergence is 
inadequate to provide an effective basis for deciding the validity of a member’s 
prudential regulatory measures.   
 
Part IV examines the WTO dispute settlement process and what role, if any, it 
should play in determining the efficacy and validity of financial regulatory standards.  
Part IV discusses WTO decision-making and its inter-institutional linkages with other 
international financial organizations.  It argues that the WTO lacks the institutional 
capacity and expertise to devise international standards of financial regulation, but 
nevertheless should coordinate its activities with other international economic 
organizations in balancing trade liberalisation principles with regulatory practices.   
 
I. The Origins of the World Trade Organization – Background to the 
GATS   
  
The origins of the WTO Agreements can be found in the failed efforts of the 
late 1940s to ratify the Havana Charter, which was intended to establish an 
‘International Trade Organization’, designed to provide an international code to 
govern trade relations that would be subject to binding dispute resolution with 
ultimate appeal to the International Court of Justice.
5
  The ITO’s primary objective 
was to reduce barriers to international trade and investment in order to secure 
economic reconstruction from the ravages of war and to build a strong economic base 
to confront the perceived threat of communism.  The provisions of the Havana 
Charter were broad, covering a wide array of economic sectors, including trade in 
goods, services, intellectual property, extending beyond trade in goods to include 
trade in services, employment practices, commodity agreements, anti-competitive 
conduct, and foreign direct investment.  The broad scope of the ITO Charter was 
intended to undo the legacy of protectionism and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies that 
most developed states had followed in the 1930s.
6
 
 
Further, the ITO was designed to serve as one of the triumvirate of ‘Bretton 
Woods’ institutions that included the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
7
  These 
international organisations were intended to function as part of a broader international 
economic regulatory regime that aspired not only to free trade and open markets, but 
also to promote stable monetary relations and sustainable long-term economic 
development.  An important corollary was that world economic recovery was to be 
achieved through increasing trade liberalization combined with stable exchange rates 
                                                 
5 See R. Hudec, ‘The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence’, Journal of World Trade Law 
(1970) vol 4, pp. 615-65.  
6 See W.A. Brown, The United States and Restoration of World Trade (1950). 
7 See discussion in Andre Newburg, ‘The Changing Roles of the Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolving 
Concepts of Conditionality’, in M. Giovanoli (ed.) International Monetary Law: Issues for the New 
Millennium (Oxford: 2000). 
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based on a par value system directly linked to the US dollar and gold.
8
  Indeed, it was 
recognized that trade liberalization and financial stability were the linchpins of a 
successful international economic system.   
 
 Although the ITO Charter was signed by over fifty participating states at the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948, 
ratification proved difficult for the United States, because the Charter’s sweeping 
trade liberalisation requirements was perceived as a threat to many US industries and 
could potentially undermine US sovereignty.  The proposed Charter’s fate was sealed 
in 1950 when the Truman administration, failing to overcome political opposition, 
withdrew it from congressional consideration, thus terminating the ITO project.  In 
January 1948, however, an interim Protocol of Provisional Application had taken 
effect that was signed by eight governments.
9
  The provisional agreement was entitled 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and was intended to codify the 
trade concessions that had already been made by its signatories during the ratification 
stage of the ITO Agreement.
10
  The agreement established binding tariffs at reduced 
levels for certain goods and provided flexibility for states to amend domestic laws 
inconsistent with parts of the GATT.
11
  Although the GATT was provisional in 
nature, it remained in effect after the demise of the ITO and became the only 
multilateral agreement regulating international trade from 1948 until the World Trade 
Organization was established in 1995.  The GATT became the institutional 
embodiment of the post-war western consensus in support of trade liberalization.  
 
 For nearly fifty years, the GATT’s legal framework governed trade relations 
between the signatory states who were known as ‘Contracting Parties’.  Over the 
years, the Contracting Parties undertook more efforts to reduce tariffs further and to 
extend trade liberalisation to a number of other economic sectors in a series of 
multilateral negotiations that became known as ‘trade rounds.’
12
  Significantly, in the 
1960s, the Kennedy Round negotiations produced an Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
while the Tokyo Round negotiations in the 1970s led to a series of agreements 
adopting principles to restrict non-tariff barriers.  These agreements were often 
referred to informally as ‘codes’ because they had been approved by only a relatively 
small number of GATT Contracting Parties (mostly industrialized states) and were 
known as ‘plurilateral agreements’ because of their voluntary membership.  Although 
these codes did not apply to all of the GATT membership, they provided the basis for 
further amendment and extension in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and some 
                                                 
8 The IMF established for its members a par value currency exchange rate system in which the value of 
member currencies was linked at a predetermined rate to the US dollar, which was in turn linked at a 
predetermined rate to gold. A member’s currency exchange value could only be changed to correct a 
‘fundamental disequilibrium’ in that member’s balance of payments, but only after consultation with 
the IMF. See Eatwell & Taylor, Global Finance At Risk, chap. 1. 
9 The eight named governments were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
10 Under US law, the GATT was an agreement, not a treaty; its legal standing was based on the 
President’s authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. By law, Congress had the power to 
approve trade agreements with majority votes of both Houses of Congress, whereas treaty approval 
requires 2/3 majority of the Senate.   
11 John H. Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO 24-25 ((2000)(providing detailed 
discussion of how the GATT was adopted and the Protocol of Provisional Application). 
12 There have been nine trade rounds beginning with Geneva in 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1951, 
Geneva 1956, Geneva (Dillon Round) 1960-61, Geneva (Kennedy Round) 1964-67, Geneva (Tokyo 
Round) 1973-79, Geneva (Uruguay Round) 1986-94.   
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evolved into binding agreements and annexes in the WTO treaty structure that had 
binding effect on all WTO members, whereas some ‘codes’ remained plurilateral with 
a voluntary WTO membership.
13
 
 
 The Uruguay Round negotiations that began in 1986 culminated in the 1994 
‘Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization’
14
 (the ‘Marrakesh 
Agreement’) which created the World Trade Organization. (Croome 1995 122-30). 
The WTO is an international organization with legal personality that provides a forum 
for intensive negotiations to obtain binding commitments from its members to reduce 
barriers to trade and a strong enforcement mechanism for such commitments through 
a Dispute Settlement Body.  The Marrakesh Agreement includes several multilateral 
trade agreements and associated legal instruments that are found in various Annexes 
to the Agreement and are binding on all members.
15
  The Agreement expressly states 
that the original GATT 1947 ‘is legally distinct’ from the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994,
16
 and the other WTO multilateral trade agreements, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 (GATS), and the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property 1994 (TRIPS).  These agreements and associated 
legal instruments are integral parts of the Marrakesh Agreement, and binding on all 
members.
17
  Further, special requirements exist for developing countries, which are 
allowed to negotiate certain departures from WTO principles and commitments.
18
 
 
The GATT 1994 extended tariff bindings to a broader range of products which 
included further commitments to reduce tariffs (with some tariffs being cut to zero), 
while only limited progress was made in restricting and curtailing non-tariff measures, 
such as import subsidies and quotas, for agricultural trade.  The trade liberalization 
principles of the GATT were extended to cross-border trade in services when the 
GATS became effective in 1995.  The GATS is a legally binding multilateral 
agreement that covers international trade in services.  Initially, the GATS contained 
four main components: (1) a framework agreement setting forth general principles 
and obligations (i.e. Most Favoured Nation ‘MFN’); (2) various annexes covering 
different services sectors; (3) negotiated schedules of specific commitments by 
individual members to provide access to their markets; and (4) negotiated lists of 
exemptions in particular services sectors showing where countries can temporarily 
exempt themselves from the MFN obligation.  The negotiated schedules of 
commitments and MFN exemptions are analogous to the commitments of tariff 
schedules under the GATT.
19
 
 
                                                 
13 The Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 4 contains the plurilateral agreements that are respectively, the 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Agreement on Government Procurement, International Dairy 
Agreement, and International Bovine Meet Agreement.  
14 See Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization’ (Apr. 1994) in Agreements Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation (199?) pp. ; see also www.wto.org . 
15 Art II 1. GATT 1994 is in Annex 1A; GATS is in Annex 1B; and the TRIPS is in Annex 1C. 
16 But the GATT 1994 expressly adopts the provisions of the GATT 1947GATT 1994 is found Annex 
1A of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
17 Marrakesh Agreement, art. II 1. 
18 See Art. XI (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement, and Art. XXXVI (8) of GATT 1994. 
19 It should be noted that, under the GATT, members are not allowed to depart from the MFN principle 
unless they have taken a waiver, whereas, under the GATS, departure from the MFN principle requires 
a member to list an exemption.  
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The foundation principles of the original GATT and the Bretton Woods 
institutions were premised on the notion that effective international trade 
liberalization could only take place within a framework of financial stability.  Since 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate regime in the 1970s, the 
liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets has resulted in dramatic growth in 
cross-border trade in financial services and capital flows, but has been accompanied 
by increased foreign exchange volatility and a substantial increase in the number of 
banking and financial crises (Eatwell & Taylor, 1999).  Presently, the Doha 
Development Agenda dominates WTO discussions.  The Doha Development Agenda 
began in November 2001, marking the start of a new and ambitious round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The original agenda was very ambitious, including 
issues such as services and agriculture (on which negotiations had already began in 
2000); trade in non-agriculture market access; rule-making; and the so-called 
Singapore issues (competition policy, investment, trade facilitation, and government 
procurement). After the breakdown of negotiations in Cancun in September 2003, 
WTO Members reshaped the agenda by dropping most of the Singapore issues (with 
the exception of trade facilitation), in the hope of providing regained momentum to 
the negotiations.  The Doha negotiations are continuing and are expected to culminate 
with a Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 
 
II. THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AGREEMENT20 
  
 The introduction of trade in services into the GATT agenda was a significant 
development in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  It quickly became apparent that the 
financial services sector was a particularly difficult area to negotiate because of 
different conceptions of how free trade in financial services could be reconciled with 
countries’ regulatory objectives.
21
  The importance of financial regulation had become 
a major issue in reaction to the increased number of financial crises that had arisen in 
part because of the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime in the 
early 1970s.  By the 1980s, there had been several more banking crises and a major 
sovereign debt crisis involving Latin American countries that highlighted the fragility 
of the international financial system.  The absence of the original Bretton Woods rules 
to regulate reserve currency values and related controls on cross-border capital flows 
exposed the international financial system to increase systemic risk that undermined 
financial stability, which was a key element of the international economic framework 
that gave birth to the GATT.   
 
The growing number of banking and currency crises in the 1980s and 1990s 
provided the context for the Uruguay Round negotiations that took place between 
1986 and 1993.  By 1993, eighty-two countries had participated in negotiations that 
had resulted in significant but varying commitments to liberalise cross-border trade in 
                                                 
20 The impetus for negotiations for a Financial Services Agreement occurred in the context of Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. See W. Dobson, ‘Financial Services Liberalization in the Millennium Round’ in K.G. Deutsche 
& B. Speyer (2001) World Trade Organization Millennium Round  98-100.   
21 See Robert B Self (1996) ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services’ pp. 523-553 in T. Stewart 
(ed.) The World Trade Organization (Chicago: American Bar Association). See also Geza Feketekuty 
(2000) ‘Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS’ pp. 85-111 in P. Sauve and R.M. Stern 
(eds.) gats 2000 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution)  
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financial services.
22
  In July 1995, ninety-five WTO members agreed to an interim 
agreement that took effect on 1 September 1996.
23
  Under the interim agreement, the 
ninety-five signatories undertook market access and national treatment commitments 
to open their banking, securities, and insurance markets and to treat each other on a 
most-favoured nation (MFN) basis.  The interim agreement, however, was conceived 
as a temporary deal that would only become permanent if the ninety-five signatories 
did not withdraw or substantially reduce their commitments by a deadline of 12 
December 1997.   
 
Negotiations resumed in April 1997 and led to an agreement being reached by 
the December 12
th
 deadline.  This new financial services agreement became known as 
the Fifth Protocol to the GATS, in which seventy WTO members (including the US, 
EU and Japan) improved their schedules of commitments on market access and 
national treatment, while thirty two others maintained existing commitments that had 
been proposed in the Uruguay Round negotiations or had been undertaken in the 1995 
interim agreement.
24
  For most signatory states, the Fifth Protocol replaced the pre-
existing schedules of commitments on national treatment and market access and the 
MFN list of exemptions that had been adopted under the 1995 interim agreement with 
modified and improved concessions in these areas.  The Fifth Protocol was legally 
significant because it created on a permanent basis binding MFN obligations and 
market access and national treatment commitments.  
 
The Fifth Protocol to the GATS became known as the 1997 Financial Services 
Agreement.  The Agreement was an important achievement because of its broad 
coverage over most financial services sectors and also in regard to the large number of 
WTO members who became signatories (102).  The Fifth Protocol to the GATS and 
the GATS Annex on Financial Services became effective on 1 March 1999.
25
  At the 
Third Ministerial WTO Conference in Seattle in late 1999, WTO members considered 
offers to increase their market access and national treatment commitments beyond 
those agreed under the Fifth Protocol, but negotiations resulted in impasse.  Following 
Seattle, GATS negotiations resumed in 2000 under the auspices of the Doha 
Development Agenda (trade round).
26
  To this end, the Council for Trade in Services 
                                                 
22 See Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet Financial Services Liberalization in the WTO 69-72 
(1998)(providing a general discussion of Uruguay Round negotiations)  
23Ibid. at 80-85. 
24See text of Fifth Protocol at http://gats.info.eu.int . See Legal Texts and Commitments – The Related 
Instruments and Protocols. It should be noted that the Fifth Protocol to the GATS does not make the 
Financial Services Annex a separate agreement under the GATS, but rather is part of the overall GATS 
Agreement. 
25 The Fifth Protocol was subject to ratification in December 1997 for a period that was originally 
scheduled to last until 29 January 1999, but was eventually extended by the WTO Council for Trade in 
Services until 15 June 1999.  The Fifth Protocol and the Annex on Financial Services took effect on 1 
December 1999.Fifty two WTO members had accepted the Protocol by the due date of 29 January 
1999, but the Council for Trade in Services decided to keep the ratification period open until 15 June 
1999, by which time the additional eighteen members had signed. Seven WTO members have not yet 
ratified the Protocol: Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Philippines, Poland, and Uruguay. 
26 Art. XIX: 1.  It states in relevant part: ‘In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members 
shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a 
progressively higher level of liberalization.’.  Article XIX creates an ongoing obligation for WTO 
members to engage in periodic negotiations for the liberalisation of service sectors through an ‘in-built 
agenda’ that began in 2000.    
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provided a mandate to the Committee on Trade in Financial Services to examine a 
broad range of issues affecting trade in financial services with a view to making 
further commitments to liberalise trade in financial services beyond those obtained in 
the Fifth Protocol.  These negotiations continue under the Doha Round and, despite 
the broad regulatory discretion to apply prudential controls, the negotiating posture of 
many member states is firmly focused on gaining access to other members’ markets 
by offering access to one’s own market on a most-favoured nation and national 
treatment basis.    
 
 
II. The General Agreement on Trade in Services  
 
The relevance of the GATS for financial sector issues lies mainly in its principles 
governing cross-border trade in financial services and its disciplines for domestic 
regulation.  The GATS contains two main parts:  (1) a framework agreement that 
consists of principles, rules and disciplines to be applied to trade in services, and 
various annexes, including one on financial services; and (2) a detailed list of WTO 
members’ schedules of specific commitments to liberalize their services sectors based 
on principles of national treatment and market access.  The GATS also incorporates 
by reference the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services that allows 
members to opt for a higher and more robust set of market access and national 
treatment commitments that would grant non-discriminatory access to all foreign 
service providers of WTO member states.
27
  It has been adopted by thirty one WTO 
Members (counting the EC as one), mostly developed countries.
28
  The thirty 
members have adopted the Understanding by cross-referencing the Understanding in 
their schedules of commitments.
29
 
 
The GATS provisions  
 
  The jurisdictional scope of the GATS is broad, as it applies to all ‘measures by 
Members affecting trade in services’, which include any law, regulation, rule, 
procedure or administrative action taken by ‘central, regional, or local governments or 
authorities’ and any measure taken by ‘non-governmental bodies’ who exercise 
delegated powers from state governments or authorities.
30
  In financial regulation, this 
would cover all state laws, regulations and administrative acts involving the 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector, including the adoption of any 
                                                 
27 The Understanding is not part of the GATS, but it is a part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round.. It 
is an optional document that sets out a blueprint for making commitments on financial services. It goes 
beyond market access commitments to specify disciplines on government procurement, non-
discriminatory measures, etc.  See text in Appendix A. 
28 See Appendix B (containing the list of the countries who adopted it).  One of the implicit goals of 
the Doha trade round negotiations is to persuade other WTO members to make commitments 
equivalent to those requested in the Understanding. 
29 For example, if you have a look at any of these 31 schedules, you will see that they all contain a 
horizontal note in the financial services section, saying that the commitments have been undertaking in 
accordance with the Understanding. 
30 Art. I: 3(a)(i)&(ii). 
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measures taken by self-regulatory bodies, such as stock exchanges, clearing and 
settlement systems or professional standards bodies, which were based on conferred 
or delegated state authority.   
The GATS defines ‘services’ broadly to include “any service in any sector except 
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”.
31
 The Annex on 
Financial Services extends this definition further by defining ‘financial services’ very 
broadly as well to include ‘any service of a financial nature offered by a financial 
service supplier of a Member.’
32
  The Annex goes on to define financial services to 
include ‘insurance and all insurance-related services’ and ‘[b]anking and other 
financial services’.
33
  Indeed, in the banking and securities sectors, the definition has 
broad application covering:  
[A]cceptance of deposits, lending of all types, financial leasing, payment 
services, guarantees and commitments, trading money market instruments, 
foreign exchange, derivatives, exchange rate and interest rate instruments, 
securities and other financial assets, money brokering, asset management, 
settlement and clearing services for financial assets, provision of financial 
information, advisory or intermediation services, and insurance services 
(GATS Annex on Financial Services). 
As noted above, however, an important exception exists for “services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority”.
34
  This includes any service not provided on a 
commercial basis or in competition with other suppliers.  Regarding state financial 
policy, this would cover the activities of central banks and other monetary authorities, 
statutory social security and public pension plans, and public entities using 
government financial services.
35
  For instance, the GATS does not apply to how a 
member state regulates its central bank regarding monetary policy or open market 
operations.
36
   
 The broad scope of the GATS and Annex on Financial Services, however, 
does not apply to a state’s regulation of capital flows and to related issues of capital 
account liberalisation, unless the member’s capital controls derogate from its specific 
commitments (except when justified under the balance of payments exception).
37
 For 
example, a member may not restrict capital flows that are necessary to make payment 
for cross-border trade in services if such services are subject to market access or 
national treatment commitments. As a general matter, however, the jurisdictional 
scope of the GATS does not cover the liberalisation of cross-border capital flows.    
The Modes of Supply   
The GATS applies to both cross-border service flows and the supply of services 
abroad by natural persons or through commercial establishment.  Part I of the GATS 
defines trade in services as taking the form of four modes of supplying services: 
cross-border trade, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of 
                                                 
31 Art. I:3(b). 
32 GATS Annex on Financial Services, para. 5 (a). 
33 Ibid. 
34 para. 1 (b). 
35 para. 1 (b) (i) & (ii). 
36 This exception would also potentially apply to the reserve requirements imposed by central banks on 
banking institutions in order to manage monetary policy and to conduct open market operations.   
37 See discussion in B. Hoekman & M. Kostecki (2002) The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System – The WTO and Beyond (Oxford: OUP) p. 259.    
 12 
natural persons.
38
  The most relevant for analysing cross-border trade in financial 
services are cross-border service flows (mode 1) and commercial presence (mode 3).
39
  
Cross-border supply is defined to cover services flowing from the territory of one 
member state into the territory of another member state (e.g. banking or insurance 
conducted via telecommunications or email).
40
  Commercial presence implies that a 
service supplier of one member establishes a territorial presence, including through 
ownership or lease of premises, in another Member’s territory in order to provide a 
service (e.g. establishing a bank branch office, brokerage office, or agencies to deliver 
legal services or communications).  Article XXVIII provides that for a mode 3 
‘commercial presence entity’ to be valid in a host country it must be owned or 
controlled by an entity based in the home country.  In the GATS, ‘ownership’ means 
more than fifty percent of the voting equity shares in a company, and ‘control’ means 
the authority to appoint a majority of the board or to appoint senior managers who are 
authorised to manage company.
41
   The commercial presence mode has been 
described as the most important,
42
 but also raises very difficult issues for host 
governments regarding regulatory issues and future liberalization of markets.   
As defined above, cross-border trade in financial services covers a number of 
areas, including instances when a service provider based in one country offers 
financial services in another, or the provider seeks the right of establishment through a 
branch or subsidiary in another country.  The type of establishment may be significant 
in a regulatory context, as many jurisdictions impose additional regulatory 
requirements on subsidiaries as opposed to branches.
43
     
The GATS General Principles  
The GATS Preamble recognizes the growing importance of trade in services, and 
states the objective of the Member countries of the GATS to “establish a multilateral 
framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of 
such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a 
means of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the development 
of developing countries.”
44
  Regarding national regulation, liberalization of trade in 
services shall promote “interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis 
and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect 
                                                 
38 Article 1:2. 
39 It should be noted that Mode 2 – Consumption abroad – has become increasingly important because 
of the growth of e-commerce and online financial services. Individuals and businesses utilise online 
financial services for a number of activities. This has raised the issue to what extent should the state be 
allowed to impose conditions or restrictions on foreign service providers who provide financial services 
on the internet to residents of the regulating state.  
40 Mode 1 cross-border supply is defined as ‘the supply of a service from the territory of one Member 
into the territory of any other Member’.   
41 See discussion Guy Karsenty (2000) ‘Assessing Trade in Services’ in P. Sauve and R.M. Stern (eds.) 
gats 2000 p. 45 n. 20. As Karsenty observes, the business entity that is owned or controlled in the host 
country is an ‘affiliate’ and the owning or controlling entity in the home country is known as a ‘parent 
company’. Also, other legal terms may be applicable for these business entities (eg., financial holding 
company).   
42 Self notes that ‘commercial presence in the territory of any other Member’ is generally ‘the mode of 
choice for a services provider who wishes to do business in foreign countries.’ Self (1996) ‘The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services’ in T.P. Stewart (ed.) The World Trade Organization p. 526.  
43 Because subsidiaries are usually incorporated under host state law and are therefore viewed as 
separate legal entities, they are more likely to be subject to more comprehensive regulation by host 
country authorities than branches. 
44  GATS, Preamble. 
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to national policy objectives”. Given asymmetries with respect to the degree of 
development of services regulations in different countries, it is important that 
countries have the tools and possibilities to exercise their right to regulate, and 
introduce new regulations in order to meet national policy objectives.   
 
Part II of GATS sets forth the “general obligations and principles” of the GATS, 
which apply to all members and to most services.  The two main general principles of 
part II are most-favoured nation status and transparency.  Article II of the GATS 
contains the most-favoured nation principle that provides, in relevant part, that “with 
respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord 
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than it accords to like services and service 
suppliers of any other country”.
45
  The MFN principle is meant to eliminate 
discriminatory treatment among services and service suppliers from different member 
countries.  It is subject to important exceptions, however, for regional economic 
agreements
46
 and for exemptions listed by members when they join the WTO which 
are permitted for a period not exceeding ten years.
47
   
Some experts have observed that the GATS’s most-favoured nation principle 
may prohibit certain informal international and bilateral agreements that are based on 
reciprocity and mutual recognition (Marchetti, 2003).  For instance, the Basel 
Committee’s principles of consolidated supervision and home-host country control 
may conflict with the MFN principle because it permits Basel Committee members to 
assess the adequacy of a foreign bank’s home country regulatory regime as a 
condition for allowing it to operate in the host country’s markets.  US banking law 
follows this approach under the Financial Services Modernization Act 1999 that 
requires the Federal Reserve to impose more onerous reporting requirements and 
capital reserves on foreign banks seeking to establish a financial holding company 
under US law if the foreign bank’s home regulator does not comply with the Basel 
Capital Accord.  Moreover, in the area of money laundering and financial crime, the 
US Patriot Act requires foreign banks whose home jurisdictions do not comply with 
the FATF Forty Recommendations on money laundering and the Eight 
Recommendations on terrorist financing to be subject to more extensive US 
regulatory scrutiny and information disclosure as a condition for participating in the 
US correspondent banking market.  The Patriot Act also authorises the US Attorney 
General and Treasury Secretary to take special measures against jurisdictions that do 
not comply with FATF or Basel Committee standards on money laundering, which 
may include sanctions or additional reporting requirements for US banks to comply 
with before undertaking any type of financial transactions with banks based in those 
jurisdictions.  There is uncertainty regarding whether these unilateral measures and 
international agreements comply with the GATS MFN principle.
48
   
                                                 
45 Article II: 1. 
46 See Article V (allowing departure from MFN principle based on rules regarding “Economic 
Integration”). 
47 Article II:2 (allowing departure from MFN for a member’s listed exemptions). See GATS Annex on 
Article II Exemptions. An exemption may be extended for a member through a waiver process under 
Article XI:3 of the WTO Agreement. 
48 Some of the uncertainty arises from the US government’s view that regulatory measures that depart 
from market access or national treatment commitments against foreign service suppliers are permitted 
because they fall into the ‘prudential carve-out’ exception in paragraph 2a of the Annex on Financial 
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The second basic principle of the GATS is that of transparency.
49
  Indeed, a major 
obstacle to doing business in a foreign country often involves a lack of information 
regarding the relevant laws and regulations of a particular jurisdiction.  This problem 
has particular importance for trade in services because many of the relevant foreign 
trade restrictions take the form of domestic regulations. Sufficient information about 
potentially relevant rules and regulations is critical to the effective implementation of 
trade agreements. To address this, GATS sets forth a transparency principle in its 
Preamble and in Articles III and VI.  Article III requires that Members publish 
promptly all measures pertaining to or affecting the operation of the GATS.
50
   
Moreover, as discussed below, Article VI:4 (a) provides a mandate for WTO 
members to negotiate domestic regulatory disciplines to ensure transparent criteria for 
qualification requirements, technical standards, and licensing procedures.  There is an 
obligation to notify the Council for Trade in Services at least annually of all legal or 
regulatory changes that significantly affect trade in sectors where specific 
commitments have been made.     
A state’s laws and regulations should be transparent, setting forth clear standards 
so that foreign traders can discern exactly what conditions must be fulfilled in order to 
conduct trade in the host jurisdiction.
51
  To improve compliance with the transparency 
obligation, Article III requires member countries to establish enquiry points for 
dissemination of trade related laws and regulations to other WTO members on 
request.
52
 Governments must establish these enquiry or contact points in order to 
respond to trade-related questions posed by suppliers of services in other countries. 
Several countries have proposed to increase the role played by these contact points by 
requiring, for instance, that national authorities of WTO members respond to the 
questions of all “interested persons” that are submitted through these contact points. 
Other proposals recommend that countries establish sector-specific enquiry points.
53
  
As a general matter and similar to the MFN obligation, there are no exceptions or 
exemptions available to WTO members in complying with the obligation of 
transparency under Article III. 
Part III of GATS contains the rules and disciplines for national treatment and 
market access.  Unlike the general obligations of most-favoured nation and 
transparency, the national treatment and market access principles are specific 
commitments that are negotiated by members.  A member does not incur a market 
access or national treatment obligation unless it expressly consents to such an 
obligation for a particular sector or sub-sector of its financial services industry.  This 
is known as a positive-list approach, which means that a member only incurs national 
treatment and market access obligations if it expressly undertakes a specific 
commitment for a designated sector or subsector and mode of supply and to the extent 
that no limitations are imposed by the member.  In contrast, a negative list approach 
                                                                                                                                            
Services, and moreover that such measures can be justified on the grounds of ‘public morals’ or ‘public 
order’, or to protect the public against fraud and economic crime as set forth in Article XIV (a)-(c ).     
49 Article III, IIIbis. 
50 Article III (1) GATS requires each member to publish promptly “all relevant measures of general 
application” that affect operation of the agreement. 
51 Article III: 1. 
52
 However, there is no requirement to disclose confidential information (Article IIIbis).   
 
53 Moreover, business lobbyists have lobbied for increased transparency of court proceedings and 
rulings on business disputes should be improved. WTO, Services 2000, Hong Kong Wish List, p. 2. 
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would only allow a country to avail itself of restrictions and limitations in applying 
national treatment and market access principles if the country in question specifically 
lists those restrictions and/or limitations in its schedules of specific commitments.
54
  
The positive list approach as set forth in the GATS provides more autonomy and 
flexibility for countries in negotiating their commitments and has particular benefit 
for developing countries who may lack the necessary expertise to understand which 
limitations or restrictions to list under a negative-list approach.    
Each member’s schedules of specific commitments are central features of the 
GATS. Article XX:3 of the GATS supports this by providing that Members’ 
Schedules are “an integral part” of the GATS and thus constitute important legal 
obligations under the WTO Agreements.  Indeed, the centrality of the Members’ 
schedules as integral components of the GATS means that members cannot avoid 
their obligations unless expressly allowed under the GATS.  Because the GATS 
covers all services except those provided in the exercise of governmental authority, it 
implies that a Member may schedule a specific commitment for any type of service.
55
  
The sectors and subsectors in a member’s schedules are mutually exclusive (eg., they 
cannot contain identical services sectors).   Moreover, the principle of transparency 
found in Article III and in the GATS preamble provides that members should 
undertake scheduling in a precise and clear manner so that all members can 
understand the scheduling commitments of all WTO members.      
The negotiations over scheduling of commitments for market access and national 
treatment in financial services began in the Uruguay Round talks in the late 1980s.  
When the negotiations concluded in 1994, the members agreed to a “standstill” that 
meant that they could not rescind or restrict their commitments in the future. These 
schedules of commitments became the basis for future negotiations that have resulted 
in further commitments by most WTO members.
56
  Significantly, these commitments 
are minimum standards of treatment and do not preclude members from taking 
autonomous measures to liberalise their markets in both scheduled and unscheduled 
sectors.  In fact, most WTO members provide much greater access to their financial 
services sectors on both a market access and national treatment basis than what they 
have actually committed themselves to do in their schedules of commitments.
57
  
Indeed, the disparity between the level of liberalisation in most members’ schedules 
of commitments and the degree of liberalisation they provide has become so great that 
GATS liberalisation commitments are a poor indicator of the extent of openness in 
international financial services markets.         
The GATS national treatment principle requires a member to ‘accord to services 
and services suppliers of any other Member . . . treatment no less favourable than that 
                                                 
54 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) follows a negative-list approach. 
See discussion below. 
55 A specific service cannot fall within two different sectors or subsectors. See GATS 2001 Scheduling 
Guidelines. 
56As discussed above, the Fifth Protocol of the GATS was agreed in December 1997 and provided a 
minimum set of liberalisation commitments in the areas of national treatment and market access.  
57 Many states have undertaken liberalisation commitments as part of regional trading agreements (eg., 
the EC and NAFTA). Other states have adopted significant liberalisation commitments that extend 
beyond their GATS commitments as part of economic and financial restructuring programmes of the 
IMF and World Bank.  Moreover, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 encouraged many Asian states (eg., 
Japan) to undertake unilateral commitments to liberalise trade in financial services in order to enhance 
foreign direct and portfolio investment. See W. Dobson (2001) pp. 98-100  
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it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.’
58
  This is a negotiated 
commitment that only applies to those sectors and modes of supply for which a 
negotiated commitment has been expressly undertaken and only to the extent the 
member has not imposed a limitation in the schedule.  The GATS provides that 
‘treatment no less favourable’ means both de jure and de facto treatment.
59
  For 
instance, even though a member may accord de jure equal treatment (formally 
identical treatment) to foreign services or service suppliers, if such identical treatment 
results in a modification of competitive conditions in favour of a domestic service 
provider, it will violate the national treatment principle (Marchetti, 2003).   
The national treatment principle seeks to ensure that foreigners are afforded 
equivalent opportunities to compete, whilst members are not under any obligation to 
guarantee success in the marketplace (Arup, 1999).  Moreover, formally differential 
treatment of foreign service providers can sometimes be justified under the national 
treatment principle where a host regulator has greater concern regarding the ability of 
foreign firms to satisfy host state regulatory objectives.  Thus, extra regulatory 
measures imposed against foreigners may be required to ensure that regulatory 
objectives are met.  In the banking sector, a host regulator may seek to impose more 
stringent capitalization requirements than host state banks are required to meet, or to 
require that foreign banks establish subsidiaries and a physical presence in the host 
state territory as a condition for obtaining access to the host state’s payment system or 
to sell financial products to host state consumers.   
The market access principle contained in article XVI reaffirms the binding nature 
of a member’s ‘specific market access commitments’ in its Schedule and makes it 
clear that each member’s specific commitments are a minimum standard of treatment 
to be applied to the services and service suppliers of all WTO members.  Article 
XVI:1 requires members to accord services and service suppliers of other Members 
“no less favourable treatment than that provided for under the terms, limitations and 
conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”
60
   In this regard, Article XVI note 8 
makes clear that a member’s authority to restrict cross-border flows of capital may be 
limited to the extent that it has undertaken a commitment to allow the cross-border 
supply of services (mode 1), or if it has made a commitment to allow the supply of 
services through cross-border commercial presence (mode 3).  The provision for mode 
1 suggests that a member may not impose any controls on the movement of capital 
into or out of its territory if the ‘capital is an essential part of the service itself’.
61
  In 
contrast, regarding commercial presence (mode 3), a member is obliged ‘to allow 
related transfers of capital into its territory’ if the capital is related to the 
establishment of a commercial presence in the host member’s territory, but only to the 
extent that the member has committed itself in its schedules to allow mode 3 
                                                 
58 Art. XVII: 1 
59 Art. XVII: 2. 
60 Article XVI:1 states in whole: “With respect to market access through modes of supply identified in 
Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no 
less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified 
in its Schedule. 
61 Article XVI:1 note 8 states in relevant part: ‘If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in 
relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of 
Article I and if the cross-border movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that 
Member is hereby committed to allow such movement of capital’. This would suggest that the member 
would be restricted from imposing controls on imports or exports of capital if the capital were an 
essential part of the provision of the service under mode 1 (cross-border supply of service). 
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commercial presence.  This language suggests that the obligation not to restrict capital 
flows only applies to imports of capital accompanying the establishment of a 
commercial presence.
62
  The requirement in mode 1 that the capital be ‘an essential 
part of the service’ supplied for a scheduled sector provides a sort of necessity test for 
determining whether the capital was really essential for the supply of the service in 
question.
63
  In contrast, the requirement in mode 3 creates a more stringent obligation 
for the host state not to restrict capital inflows that are ‘related transfers of capital’ to 
the supply of services in a cross-border commercial establishment (eg., local branch 
of a foreign bank).     
Article XVI:2 sets out six measures that restrict market access and which a 
member cannot impose on a sector that is subject to a specific commitment, unless the 
restrictive measure is ‘otherwise specified in its Schedule.’  The first four measures 
cover quantitative limitations on market access (eg., limiting the number of service 
suppliers in a particular sector, or limiting the number of persons that may be 
employed in a particular sector or by a particular supplier). The fifth measure covers 
controls that restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through 
which a service supplier may supply a service, while the sixth measure restricts 
limitations on the participation of foreign capital.
64
   
The rules and disciplines that apply to the principles of national treatment and 
market access are by far the most significant in influencing the particular types of 
liberalisation commitments a member undertakes.  These provisions have implications 
for a member’s regulation of cross-border capital flows and may affect existing 
obligations of IMF members who have not yet assumed Article VIII (2) status under 
the Fund agreement.  Although the positive-list approach allows states to proceed at 
their own pace in making liberalisation commitments, it has been criticised on the 
grounds that it takes all services sectors (including those not yet listed in the GATS 
Scheduling Guidelines) off the liberalisation agenda until a state specifically 
designates a particular sector for national treatment or market access (Dobson, 2001). 
The argument asserts that states are subject to protectionist pressures and will be 
reluctant to designate specific services sectors to be liberalised without institutional 
and legal commitment. Many of those who hold these views would prefer a negative-
list approach in which there would be a presumption that WTO members would 
                                                 
62 Article XVI:1 note 8 states in relevant part: ‘If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in 
relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2© of Article 
I, it is hereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory’. This suggests that a 
member is prohibited from imposing capital controls on imports (only) of capital that are related to the 
provision of a service through commercial presence under mode 3.   
63 For example, a country (say, Country B) might restrict the cross-border distribution of the proceeds 
of a loan issued by a bank based in Country B to a borrower resident in Country A on the grounds that 
the foreign exchange controls of Country B might restrict the transfer of some or all of the proceeds of 
the loan to a person in Country A.  However, if Country B has made a specific commitment in its 
GATS schedules to allow cross-border transfer of the proceeds of bank loans to borrowers in other 
WTO member countries, then such a restriction by Country B would breach its GATS obligations.  
64 The six types of limitations that a member may not impose on the provision of services in a 
particular sector where it has made a market access commitment are limitations: (1) on the number of 
service suppliers; (2) on the total value of services transactions or assets; (3) on the total number of 
service operations or the total quantity of service output; (4) on the number of persons that may be 
employed in a particular sector or by a particular supplier; (5) measures that restrict or require supply 
of the service through specific types of legal entity or joint venture; (6) percentage limitations on the 
participation of foreign capital, or limitations on the total value of foreign investment.  However, a 
member can impose one of these limitations on a scheduled sector if it has expressly stated  or 
‘inscribed’ such a limitation in its schedule of specific commitments. 
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provide full national treatment and market access for all services sectors, except 
where they have expressly listed limitations or prohibitions in their schedules.  This 
would accelerate the liberalisation agenda in the GATS and potentially undermine the 
ability of domestic regulators to manage their local financial markets.  On the other 
hand, the negative-list approach may result in a deepening off capital markets by 
allowing more foreign lenders and financial service providers to enter local markets.  
This may result in technology and skill transfer to undeveloped economies and an 
infusion of capital that increases liquidity and perhaps promotes financial stability.  
Domestic regulators would still have discretion to impose restrictions on cross-border 
capital flows in the event of a financial or other crisis.   Moreover, states that 
autonomously open their markets outside the GATS negotiating framework (eg., 
under an IMF or World Bank assistance programme) should be given credit in the 
GATS for such autonomous efforts.     
Domestic Regulation of Financial Services 
Part II of GATS also contains disciplines on domestic regulation of services and 
services suppliers.  Significant barriers to cross-border trade in services can arise from 
the requirements of domestic regulation.  The GATS recognises that domestic 
regulation can take the form of licensing requirements and technical standards that do 
not constitute unlawful trade barriers, but which nevertheless pose obstacles to market 
access and result in excessively burdensome compliance costs that nullify the benefits 
deriving from a member’s liberalisation commitments.  To address these barriers, 
Article VI prohibits members that have undertaken specific commitments
65
 from 
maintaining technical standards and licensing requirements that form unnecessary 
trade barriers or that nullify or impair commitments that have been undertaken (Art. 
VI:5).
66
  For instance, a member must ensure that its qualification and licensing 
requirements and technical standards and procedures are based on transparent and 
objective criteria, and are not unnecessarily burdensome to ensure the quality of the 
service.
67
  This suggests that a necessity test could be applied to determine whether a 
member’s qualification and licensing requirements or technical standards do not 
nullify or impair the member’s commitments.     
In the case of a bank, licensing requirements may take the form of fit and proper 
standards for senior management and board members, while technical standards may 
take the form of capital adequacy standards.  Under article XVI, these do not 
constitute restrictions on market access, but they may violate article VI if they are not 
based on transparent and objective criteria and are more burdensome than necessary 
to ensure the quality of the service.  Moreover, where a member’s capital adequacy 
requirements are higher for foreign banks than for domestic ones, the national 
treatment principle may be contravened, unless the member has scheduled the 
limitations on national treatment in its schedule of commitments or the discriminatory 
measure in question was taken for a prudential reason and thus falls within the 
prudential exception.  However, even if the minimum capital standards are not 
discriminatory as applied between foreign and domestic banks, they must still comply 
with the disciplines of Article VI’s domestic regulation requirements.  Article VI 
disciplines raise important issues regarding the nature and scope of domestic 
                                                 
65 Applies to specific commitments taken under Article XVI (market access), Article XVII (national 
treatment), and Article XVIII (any other commitments). 
66 For thorough coverage of Article VI disciplines, see Markus Krajewski, The GATS and Domestic 
Regulation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International). 
67 Art VI: 4 (a)&(b) and 5 (a). 
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regulation and could potentially serve as a point of convergence for the development 
of financial regulatory standards. 
Article VI:1 requires members to ensure that all regulatory measures are applied 
in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner to sectors where commitments have 
been made.  Similarly, where a service provider has applied for authorisation from a 
domestic authority to provide services, the competent authorities shall respond to the 
application in a reasonable period of time after the submission of the completed 
application.
68
  In considering an application to provide services from a foreign service 
provider, members are required to establish as soon as practicable judicial, arbitral, 
or administrative tribunals to which a foreign service provider can seek review and 
appropriate remedies for administrative or regulatory actions taken that affect the 
provision of services by the foreign service provider.
69
  
Article VI:4 exhorts WTO members to engage in negotiations to develop 
disciplines to ensure that regulatory measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services.  These disciplines should be based on 
objective and transparent criteria and on the principle that regulatory requirements 
should not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.  
In contrast with the other Article VI provisions, section VI:4 disciplines apply to all of 
a member’s services sectors, regardless of whether the member has scheduled specific 
commitments under Part III for market access or national treatment.  However, for 
these disciplines to become effective, they must contain substantive content, which 
members can only provide through negotiations.  To this end, the WTO GATS 
Committee on Domestic Regulation has achieved very little in its negotiations over 
domestic regulation disciplines.
70
       
In addition, Article VI disciplines may have a disproportionate impact on 
developing and poorer countries which do not have the sophisticated regulatory 
apparatus, legal framework and economic system to provide the necessary level of 
administrative review, notice and regulatory transparency required under Article VI.
71
 
This could put many developing countries at a disadvantage because of the 
disproportionate costs of complying with such standards.  In contrast, developed 
countries with the experience and resources to administer complex regulatory regimes 
will have an advantage in complying with Article VI disciplines.   
Domestic regulation and transparency  
 
Effective supervision requires reliable information on the financial condition of 
the institution. Access to such information includes the availability of records and the 
regular publication of financial statements based on accepted accounting standards. 
The goal is to provide a true and fair view of a firm’s financial position with some 
indication of the broader condition of a particular financial sector.   The benefits of 
transparency, however, are not absolute. Although transparency can provide investors 
and depositors with more information that can enable them to offset risks, it can also 
                                                 
68 Art VI; 3. 
69 Art VI:2 (a). Members are not required to adopt regulatory institutions or procedures where it would 
be inconsistent with its constitutional structure or legal system.  Art. VI: 2(b).   
70 In 2003, the US government proposed minimum requirements for transparency in the publication and 
accessibility of domestic regulation standards.  
71 Art VI: 2(a) & 3. 
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result in increased volatility that can, in certain circumstances, undermine financial 
stability.
72
  Therefore, regulators should strike a balance between the application of 
strict prudential requirements (eg., capital adequacy and transparency) and the need in 
certain circumstances to forbear in the application of such standards.  The optimal 
level of transparency for financial markets should be determined by the prudential 
objectives of the regulator that are established by law and/or regulation. 
 
In addition, Article XIV GATS allows members to adopt regulatory measures 
that depart from their specific commitments and obligations if the measure falls into 
an Article XIV exception.  For example, a member may impose a restriction on a 
market access commitment where to do so is “necessary to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order”.
73
  The protection of public morals might involve the regulator 
in adopting measures against financial crime or fraud, while the maintenance of 
‘public order’ might involve measures to protect against financial instability, but can 
only be taken where there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat posed to one of 
the fundamental interests of society.
74
  Exceptions also exist ‘to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health’.
75
  Also in the area of financial services, Article XIV contains 
an exception allowing a member to take a measure that departs from its specific 
commitments if it is necessary to prevent ‘deceptive and fraudulent practices’.
76
  The 
chapeau of Article XIV, however, states that a member cannot apply measures in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in 
services.  Article XIV appears to adopt a necessity test that allows a member state to 
depart from its commitments if the measure in question is necessary to achieve a valid 
regulatory objective, and does not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination against members where like conditions prevail.  This necessity test 
would likely constrain the regulatory discretion of national authorise in supervising 
their financial markets by restricting their ability to impose measures that may conflict 
with market access or national treatment commitments.   
 
Macroeconomic stability and ongoing liberalisation  
Regarding macroeconomic stability, Article XII of the GATS allows a state to 
impose restrictions on cross-border trade in services that are necessary to safeguard 
the balance of payments.
 77
  This would permit members in serious balance of 
payments difficulties – or threatened by such difficulties – to restrict trade in services 
for which they have undertaken commitments.  Such restrictions may be utilized by 
developing countries, or countries in transition, if such measures are necessary to 
maintain a level of reserves adequate for the prudential management of their 
economies.  These restrictions, however, must not discriminate among members, 
                                                 
72 This has also been recognized in the area of monetary policy where Ferrarini has noted that 
“transparency of the foreign exchange markets coupled with the high volatility sometimes attributed to 
trading activity has been said to reduce the effectiveness of individual national governments’ monetary 
policies”. Guido Ferrarini (ed.)(1994) Prudential Regulation of Banks and Securities Firms, p. 173. 
73 Art XIV (a). 
74 Art XIV, note 5. 
75 Art XIV (b). 
76 Art XIV ©(i). 
77 The GATT also contains provisions that address financial stability concerns regarding a member’s 
right to derogate from liberalization commitments when it is suffering a severe balance of payments 
imbalances.  See GATT Articles XII and XVIII:B. 
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cause unnecessary damage to the trading interests of other members, or be 
unnecessarily restrictive, and temporarily phased out as the situation improves.  
Although the restrictions may focus on a particular sector, they must not be used or 
maintained as a protectionist trade barrier.  Restrictions adopted pursuant to Article 
XII must be reviewed periodically by the WTO Balance of Payments Committee.  
And a member may not restrict international transfers and payments for current 
transactions (except as permitted by Article XII) if to do so would violate the 
members’ specific services commitments. 
  Article XIX addresses the ongoing obligation of states to engage in periodic 
negotiations for the liberalization of trade in services.  It obliges members to ‘enter 
into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter,’.  The 
GATS adheres to the view that increased liberalization in financial services trade will 
increase the competitiveness of a member’s financial sector while enhancing stability 
by promoting financial innovation and deepening of capital markets.  The 
liberalization process should take account of national policy and regulatory 
objectives
78
  It recognizes that liberalisation measures may have differential impact on 
developed and developing countries.    
 
Article XXI permits members to reverse binding liberalization commitments 
after they have been in force for three years without regard to the rationale for such 
change so long as the member undertaking the modification in commitments provides 
compensation to other WTO members whose interests are impaired.  The GATS also 
requires member states to engage in ongoing negotiations with a view to taking 
further commitments to open markets on a national treatment and market access basis.   
       
The Prudential Carve-out  
The prudential supervision of financial institutions and financial markets has 
become a major policy issue in recent years due to the increasing globalisation of 
financial markets that has been facilitated by deregulation and liberalisation of the 
provision of financial services and accompanying capital flows. Many authorities 
agree that the overall objective of prudential supervisory and regulatory regimes is to 
promote the development of safe and sound banking systems.
79
  Recent banking crises 
in Asia and Latin America have highlighted the importance of adopting sound 
prudential regulatory regimes to enhance financial stability that are based, inter alia, 
on the capital adequacy of banks, transparent accounting frameworks, and enhanced 
corporate governance standards for financial institutions.  Outside the banking sector, 
prudential regulation can encompass conduct of business rules designed primarily to 
protect consumers, investors and policyholders (Andenas & Avgerinos, 2003)     
Prudential rules help financial institutions to measure and manage their exposure 
to risk. Supervision of a highly regulated financial system is different from 
supervision of a system open to domestic and foreign competition. Opening financial 
markets to foreign financial firms can itself contribute to strengthening domestic 
                                                 
78 Art XIX: 2 . ‘The process of liberalisation shall take place with due respect for national policy 
objectives and the level of development of individual Members, both overall and in individual sectors.’  
79 See J.L. Eatwell & L. Taylor, Global Finance At Risk: The Case for International Regulation (2000); 
Joseph Norton, Devising International Standards of Banking Regulation (1995) ; CAE Goodhart  et al. 
(1999) Financial Regulation – Why, how and where? Chap. 2. 
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financial systems though the creation of more competitive and efficient host-country 
markets.
80
 At the same time, adequate prudential regulation and supervision play an 
important role in achieving the maximum benefits of liberalization while minimizing 
the risks. The measures to promote competitive markets must be complemented by 
measures to ensure the stability of the financial system and to provide adequate 
protection for consumers of financial services.
81
 
 
The efficient operation of financial markets will depend on the quality of the 
information that the regulator releases to the public. Prudential supervision often 
involves a decision by the supervisor regarding how much information to release to 
the public regarding a particular bank or financial firm.  An effective liberalization 
process should be governed by a legal and regulatory framework that authorizes the 
regulator to make these decisions based on legally established prudential standards. 
For instance, the regulator should have a reasonable discretion to decide where to 
draw the line between adopting regulations that promote competition, on the one 
hand, and regulations that may restrict competition but serve a legitimate prudential 
purpose, on the other. 
The Uruguay Round negotiators were aware of the importance of prudential 
regulation to the efficient and stable operation of financial markets.  However, WTO 
member states have taken a variety of views regarding what the prudential carve-out 
might mean.
82
  Many observers have taken the view that the carve-out should be 
interpreted broadly on the grounds that the banking and financial services industry 
deserve special treatment because of the systemic risks that banks, investment 
services firms, insurance companies and other providers of finance pose to the 
economy (Dobson & Jacquet, 1998).  Moreover, in many jurisdictions, national 
regulatory authorities have typically enjoyed broad supervisory discretion in applying 
various regulatory instruments to oversee and control financial institutions and market 
participants.   
Accordingly, GATS negotiators agreed on a broadly stated prudential exception 
that would cover divergent regulatory approaches by allowing member state 
regulators to depart from GATS commitments for prudential reasons as follows:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement, a member shall not 
be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policyholders, or persons to whom a 
fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the 
integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not 
conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a 
                                                 
80 Key, GATS 2000: Issues for the Financial Services Negotiations, p. 6.  
81 Key, GATS 2000: Issues for the Financial Services Negotiations, p. 7. 
82 For instance, Colombia took the view during Uruguay Round negotiations that the prudential carve-
out in paragraph 2 of the Annex on Financial Services and Article VI of the GATS (domestic 
regulation) should allow Members to take both prudential and non-prudential measures to ensure the 
stability and integrity of the financial system. Communication from Colombia, S/CSS/W/96 (July 9, 
2001).  An alternative view was expressed by Malaysia that the prudential carve-out be interpreted 
strictly according to its language. Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 3-6 
December 2001, Note by the Secretariat, S/CSS/M/13, at 60 (February 26, 2002).  Japan and the United 
States asserted that prudential measures were to be left to the discretion of member states.  Id. at 57. 
However, the EC and its Member States interpreted the carve-out as not permitting members to use 
prudential controls as “means of avoiding GATS market access and national treatment commitments.” 
Communication from the EC and their Member States, GATS 2000: Financial Services, S/CSS/W/39, ¶ 
21 (November 22, 2000).   
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means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.83    
 
The first sentence of paragraph 2 (a) is the so-called prudential carve-out which 
authorises a Member to take prudential regulatory measures that may restrict financial 
service trade.
84
 The second sentence of paragraph 2 (a) qualifies the first sentence, 
providing that such measures allowed by the first sentence shall not be used as a 
means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the GATS. The 
second sentence appears to authorize members to take ‘measures that do not conform 
to the provisions of the Agreement,’ but adds that such measures ‘shall not be used as 
a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.’ Some observers note that the scope of the prudential carve-out is 
ambiguous.
85
  
The ‘prudential carve-out’ allows states to impose regulatory barriers to trade in 
financial services if such measures are adopted for ‘prudential reasons’ or to ‘ensure 
the integrity and stability of the financial system’.
86
  The definition of ‘prudential 
reasons’ includes the protection of investors, depositors, policyholders, or persons to 
whom a financial service supplier owes a fiduciary duty.  No guidance is provided, 
however, regarding the types of regulatory standards and rules that would be 
necessary to accomplish these prudential objectives.  Similarly, it is not clear what 
measures would be necessary to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial 
system.  It provides that States will only be allowed to impose regulatory barriers on 
cross-border trade in financial services if such measures are adopted for ‘prudential 
reasons’ and not used to circumvent a member’s specific commitments and general 
obligations under the GATS.  The prudential carve-out is essentially an escape clause 
that provides national regulators with the discretion to take regulatory measures that 
may contravene GATS obligations and commitments.
87
  For instance, some countries, 
such as China, have taken the view that they can derogate from their specifically 
negotiated commitments on market access and national treatment if the derogation is 
taken for a prudential reason.
88
   
Moreover, it is not clear what standards of prudential regulation could withstand 
a challenge in a dispute settlement proceeding.  Some countries suggest that a dispute 
panel might use generally accepted international standards of prudential supervision 
as a benchmark for determining whether a member’s regulatory controls comply with 
                                                 
83 GATS Annex on Financial Services, para. 2(a). 
84  WTO Secretariat, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 176 (Kluwer Law International 
1999).   
85 Kalypso Nicolaidis and Joel Trachtman (2000) ‘Policed Regulation to Managed Recognition’ in P. 
Sauve & R.M. Stern, eds., GATS 2000 (Washington DC: Brookings Institute)(arguing that ‘[t]he scope 
of this “prudential carve-out” is unclear’) p. 255.  
86 Ibid.  
87 For example, a national authority might argue that it is a prudential measure to adopt restrictions on 
short-term bank capital inflows to the local market in order to reduce volatility in the banking sector, 
even though such a measure might directly conflict with a specific commitment not to impose such a 
measure.     
88 See ‘US-China Trade Relations Growing Steadily, Some Stumbling Blocks Remain’, Issue 12 (28 
June 2002)(discussing US objections at a meeting of the WTO Council on Trade in Services on 5 June 
2002 about discriminatory Chinese regulations that impose restrictive branching requirements for 
foreign non-life insurance firms).  
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GATS.
89
  This may result in using the Basel Capital Accord and other core principles 
of banking supervision as reference points for assessing whether a member’s 
regulatory restrictions on financial services trade are justified for prudential reasons.  
The objection to using the Capital Accord or other core principles to determine GATS 
compliance would be that standard-setting in the Basel Committee lacks 
accountability and legitimacy because its decision-making process is closed to non-
G10 countries.   
Paragraph 3 of the Annex seeks to promote harmonization of prudential 
regulatory practices by encouraging members to negotiate and recognize the 
prudential regulatory standards of other members with a view to promoting 
convergence in regulatory standards.  The objective would be to make it more 
difficult to deviate from generally accepted regulatory practices that would depart 
from a member’s general obligations and specific commitments.  Specifically, 
paragraph 3, entitled Recognition, allows a member to recognize the prudential 
measures of any other member in determining how the Member’s measures relating to 
financial services shall be applied.
90
  This provision states that ‘such recognition, 
which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be based upon an 
agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may be accorded 
autonomously.’   Further, paragraph 3(b) states that if a member is a party to such an 
agreement, it
91
 
 
shall afford adequate opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their 
accession to such agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones with 
it, under circumstances in which there would be equivalent regulation, oversight, 
implementation of such regulation, and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the 
sharing of information between the parties to the agreement or arrangement. 
 
Paragraph 3 (a) & (b) seeks to facilitate bilateral and multilateral agreements 
or arrangements amongst members that would work on the basis of mutual 
recognition with an obligation not to exclude other members who commit to adopt 
regulatory standards substantially in compliance with the standards agreed – either 
bilaterally or multilaterally – between any members.  This mutual recognition 
framework seeks to encourage members to negotiate a prudential minimum standard 
or common denominator for banking and financial institutions that operates on an 
international basis.
92
  In theory, this would create a ‘level playing field’, thus 
promoting competition objectives, by allowing for comparative advantage to shape 
the development of international trade in financial services.  In practice, however, no 
negotiations to enter such agreements have taken place.  Although the principle of 
promoting harmonized prudential standards amongst WTO members is an attractive 
proposition for those who espouse the merits of regulatory competition, the lack of 
progress by members to make agreements or arrangements in this area demonstrates 
that this will probably not serve as an effective mechanism for developing efficient 
and accountable standards of prudential regulation in global financial markets.   
                                                 
89 See WTO Doc. S/CSS/W/71, Communication from Switzerland (that prudential regulation should be 
interpreted according standards set by international bodies, ie. Basel Committee), and WTO 
Doc.S/CSS/W/27, Communication from United States (that GATS obligations and commitments 
should not prejudice a member’s prudential regulatory discretion).   
90 Annex on Financial Services, para, 3 (a). 
91 Para. 3(b). 
92 These agreements would be recorded with the Trade in Services Division of the WTO Secretariat. 
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As discussed above, Article XIV GATS (General Exceptions) contains a 
necessity test, which means that a Member must prove that it is “necessary” to take an 
exceptional measure. However, the term ‘necessary’ or a ‘necessity test’ is not 
included in the text of the prudential carve-out.  This may imply that it is not 
necessary for a Member to prove that a prudential measure that has the effect of 
restricting cross-border trade in financial services is necessary to achieve a valid 
regulatory objective. Compared with other general exceptions in the GATS which 
have an objective necessity standard, the prudential carve-out is flexible and, to some 
extent, subjective. According to this view, the prudential carve-out lacks detailed 
standards and limitations.  
 
Prudential regulation in the GATS could also take account of other concepts, 
such as public morals and public order as set forth under Article XIV (a) of the 
GATS.  Public morals could potentially apply to justify WTO members departing 
from their commitments in order to prevent fraud or financial crime, whilst public 
order could involve members adopting prudential measures to maintain safety and 
soundness of the banking system.  The application of a ‘public morals’ or ‘public 
order’ exception under Article XIV (a) would involve the use of a necessity test to 
ensure that the regulatory measures adopted are ‘necessary’ or proportional ‘to protect 
public morals or to maintain public order.’  This could involve an assessment 
regarding whether the regulatory measure in question could achieve its objective with 
the least restrictive impact on trade.  It could also involve a proportionality test that 
would weigh and balance the benefits of the regulatory measure against the 
corresponding costs imposed on trade. 
 
WTO member states have taken a variety of views regarding how the prudential 
carve-out should be defined.
93
  Some academics have argued that prudential 
regulation should be understood within a broader international framework of banking 
supervision that has been established by the various International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), including the standard setting bodies at the Bank for International 
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.
94
   This view holds that, because 
domestic prudential regulation is being significantly influenced by international 
standard setting bodies, the WTO and its dispute settlement body should make 
reference to the prudential standards adopted by international financial standard 
setters (eg., the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision).
95
  According to this 
approach, prudential regulation should be understood within a coherent international 
                                                 
93 For instance, during the WTO meetings, Colombia took the view that paragraph 2 of the Annex on 
Financial Services and Article VI of the GATS (domestic regulation) should allow Members to take 
both prudential and non-prudential measures to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial 
system. Communication from Colombia, S/CSS/W/96 (July 9, 2001).  In contrast, Malaysia insisted 
that there be “no flexibility to introduce any changes to the so-called prudential carve-out”.Council for 
Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 3-6 December 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 
S/CSS/M/13, at 60 (February 26, 2002).  Japan claimed that Members should be cautious when 
discussing limitations respecting the right to take prudential measures. Id. at 57. However, the EC and 
its Member States emphasised that prudential measures should not be used “as a means of avoiding 
GATS market access and national treatment commitments.”Communication from the EC and their 
Member States, GATS 2000: Financial Services, S/CSS/W/39, ¶ 21 (November 22, 2000).   
94 See Christine Breining and Rolf Weber (2005) ‘Reconciling Liberalized Trade in Financial Services 
and Domestic Regulation’ unpublished paper on file with author.  
95 Ibid. 
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institutional framework of financial regulation.  The various international standard 
setting bodies that cover banking, securities and insurance services (Basel Committee, 
IOSCO, and IAIS) provide such a framework and their standards are generally 
accepted by the majority of countries.  The prudential standards established by these 
international bodies should become benchmarks to determine the content and 
substantive requirements of prudential regulation under the GATS.
96
   
 
For example, if one were to address the issue of prudential regulation and 
transparency, it might be relevant to examine the transparency and disclosure 
standards that have been developed by international standard setting bodies.  For 
instance, in banking supervision, the Core Principles on Banking Supervision were 
adopted in 1997 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and contain 
important transparency standards to be applied in the banking sector.  Core Principle 
21 provides that bank supervisors must be satisfied that banks maintain adequate 
records produced from generally accepted accounting practices.
97
  The supervisor 
must have access to banking records that allow it to obtain a true and fair view of the 
financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business.  The bank should 
publish regularly financial statements that provide a fair view of its condition.
98
 
 
To address some of the uncertainties surrounding this issue, the WTO Council for 
Trade in Services has provided the Committee on Trade in Financial Services with a 
mandate to discuss issues related to establishing GATS-compliant standards of 
domestic financial regulation.  The Committee, however, has made little, if any, 
progress in this area.  For instance, the Committee has addressed, but only to a limited 
extent, the desirability of whether or not to define the scope of the prudential 
exception; various ideas have been mentioned, including the feasibility of establishing 
an international standard of prudential regulation,
99
 but no formal action has taken 
place.  Although the Committee’s terms of reference are broad, and include the 
possibility of making proposals to the Council regarding all issues related to trade in 
financial services, the Committee has been under-utilised in this respect, and it is 
unknown at this time whether any members will, in the near future, make any formal 
proposals to clarify the ‘prudential exception.’  Nevertheless, the issue is assuming 
increasing importance, especially in today’s turbulent global financial markets, 
because states are confronted with the contradictory pressures to keep domestic 
financial markets open to foreign capital and financial services as part of economic 
restructuring efforts, whilst also seeking to develop regulatory measures to promote 
financial stability.
 100
   
 
                                                 
96 Ibid. 
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99 See WTO Doc. S/CSS/W/71, Communication from Switzerland (that prudential regulation should be 
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The breadth of the prudential carve-out undermines the stability of expectations of 
WTO members regarding their negotiated liberalisation commitments in the GATS.  
There is no uniformly applicable definition of prudential regulation.  The lack of 
generally accepted international standards in this area may result in the emasculation 
of the GATS in terms of its application to cross-border trade in financial services.  At 
present, national authorities can arguably adopt overly broad regulatory controls that 
can unnecessarily restrict international trade in financial services on prudential 
grounds.  This could have implications for the efficiency and stability of financial 
systems.  This paper does not suggest any definition of the term. However, it 
emphasises that the prudential concept must be interpreted according to uniform 
criteria and benchmarks that are recognised internationally.  The promulgation of 
these standards must meet the criteria of accountability and legitimacy so that state 
authorities adopt and impose prudential regulatory controls for financial stability and 
investor protection and not for protectionist objectives.     
 
 
Dispute Resolution   
 
Unlike international financial standard-setting bodies, such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the GATS and its Annex on Financial Services 
are legally binding agreements for WTO members that are backed by the powerful 
enforcement mechanism of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) is the agreement that provides for a dispute 
resolution process (DSP) whereby members may commence proceedings before a 
panel of experts to determine whether another member’s trade restrictions violate 
obligations under the WTO Agreements.  DSP panels are ad hoc and rely on a 
legalistic approach to interpreting WTO agreements and determining compensation 
for breach.
101
  The DSP could potentially be used to interpret whether a member’s 
financial regulatory measures comply with GATS principles and the member’s 
schedules of commitments for market access and national treatment.  It could also be 
used to determine whether a member’s regulatory measures are taken for prudential 
reasons and therefore fall within the prudential exception.  The ad hoc and legalistic 
nature of DSP adjudications, and the WTO’s limited resources to provide expertise in 
regulatory matters, suggests that the DSP is an inappropriate forum to resolve 
complex disputes regarding the permissibility of a member’s regulatory measures 
under the GATS.  Moreover, most panellists and Appellate Body members are 
experienced mainly with trade policy, and less with regulatory issues, and so will 
likely impart a perspective that militates in favour of a member’s liberalisation 
commitments and obligations at the expense of its regulatory objectives.  This could 
potentially weaken domestic regulatory regimes for financial services and thereby 
increase financial fragility in many financial systems.   
 
Moreover, dispute panels could potentially use various tests and standards of 
review that would make it difficult to uphold the validity of a regulatory measure that 
may derogate from a member’s commitments.  These standards of review might 
possibly rely on a necessity test (or similar test) that would make it difficult for a 
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 The Annex on Financial Services provides that experts in the area of financial regulation and trade 
will be appointed as dispute panelists if a claim is brought under the Annex.   
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member to demonstrate that its departure from a WTO obligation or commitment was 
justified on prudential grounds.  For instance, a member might be required to show 
that the prudential measure in question was the least restrictive measure possible to 
accomplish the regulatory objective.  This would substantially limit domestic 
regulatory autonomy, especially in a sensitive area like banking regulation.  
Moreover, when evaluating the validity of substantive standards of banking 
regulation, a panel might possibly resort to the international standards adopted by 
various supervisory bodies (eg., Basel Committee) as a benchmark for determining 
the legality of a regulatory measure.  This would be objectionable on policy grounds 
precisely because the standards these bodies approve are determined primarily by the 
rich industrial states and therefore should not be universally applicable to all countries 
who are subject to WTO dispute proceedings.  The use of the DSP therefore to 
determine the limits of prudential regulatory standards may undermine the 
sovereignty and regulatory discretion necessary for WTO members to apply efficient 
standards of financial regulation.   
 
Standards of Review  
 
WTO members recognise the breadth of the prudential exception and generally 
regard it as an escape clause that allows host country regulators to impose regulatory 
controls for prudential reasons if the goal or objective is to promote the stability and 
integrity of the financial system or to protect policyholders, depositors, or investors.  
Although a prudential regulatory control cannot be taken for the purpose of avoiding a 
member’s commitments under the GATS, many regulators could potentially adopt a 
measure that is taken ostensibly for a prudential reason but nevertheless has the effect 
of undermining or diminishing the effectiveness of a member’s specific commitments.   
The DSP would be in the position of playing an ad hoc role in evaluating the types of 
regulatory measures used by a member and whether such controls cause a member to 
depart from its schedule of specific commitments.  It is argued that the DSP is not an 
appropriate forum for devising future looking standards for determining whether a 
member’s domestic financial regulation is GATS compliant.  Moreover, efficiency 
and legitimacy concerns suggest that the WTO should adopt additional legislative 
capacity to find a better synthesis in weighing these issues or should rely on other 
international economic organizations to implement legitimate standard setting that can 
be used as a reference for dispute settlement panels.  The rapid changes occurring in 
the financial services sector necessitate a consensus approach to standard-setting that 
involves all countries – either directly or indirectly – while de-emphasising 
contentious approaches, such as the DSP.     
 
The DSP is an inappropriate forum to decide disputes regarding the scope and 
substance of a member’s prudential regulation.  It is important therefore to reach some 
consensus over the types of legitimate regulatory standards and practices that could 
have the effect of restricting trade in financial services but which may be necessary to 
reduce systemic risk and to protect consumers and investors.  These international 
norms of prudential supervision are not found in binding treaties or in customary 
international law, nor should they be found in the standards adopted by IFIs, such as 
the Basel Committee, on the grounds of accountability and legitimacy.  Alternative 
international regulatory structures therefore should be considered as a way of building 
more efficient international standards of prudential supervision and for determining 
what types of controls to place on cross-border capital flows.  These standards should 
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be adopted through an effective decision-making process that is accountable to those 
countries that are subject to its application.  Furthermore, these countries must have 
the opportunity to exercise some type of meaningful influence over the development 
of such international standards.   
 
The overall objective of WTO members regarding financial sector issues will be 
to negotiate liberalization commitments on the basis of national treatment and market 
access but to maintain their regulatory discretion to impose prudential controls that 
may have the effect of restricting cross-border trade in financial services, possibly in 
derogation of their specific commitments.  The substantive content and scope of a 
WTO member’s prudential controls may not be within the purview of the GATS and 
WTO dispute settlement process.  The GATS does not divest domestic regulators of 
legal authority to adopt substantive requirements of financial regulation.  For many 
countries, however, there are market pressures and official incentives from 
international organizations to adhere to the prudential regulatory standards of 
international financial institutions (IFIs) As mentioned above, a dispute settlement 
panel or appellate body could possibly decide to use the prudential standards of the 
IFIs (eg., Basel Committee and IMF) as a benchmark for determining the validity of a 
member’s prudential measures under the GATS.  The major objection to this would 
be on accountability and legitimacy grounds because of the exclusive membership of 
IFIs and their opaque decision-making structures.  Accordingly, WTO members 
should be reluctant to entertain such proposals until there has been reform of 
international standard setting. 
 
WTO Decision-making and Institutional Linkages   
 
 Under the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council have exclusive authority to adopt interpretive decisions of the 
various WTO agreements.
102
  The Ministerial Conference conducts a plenary meeting 
every two years at which the political leaders of WTO member states meet to set 
goals and objectives and to approve the work of the General Council.  The General 
Council is composed mainly of trade diplomats from all WTO members, and they 
meet monthly to prepare the groundwork for the Ministerial Conferences.  The 
Council also serves as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement 
Body.  It also has the authority to make interpretative decisions of the various WTO 
multilateral and plurilateral agreements.  It also can set the agenda and policy 
programmes for the three WTO Trade Councils that deal respectively with trade in 
goods, services, and intellectual property.  The Council delegates authority to these 
Trade Councils to examine proposals by members on trade issues, negotiating 
procedures, and the division of responsibilities among WTO Committees.  It also  
influences which members will be involved in vetting meetings where WTO policy 
and negotiation procedures are examined. 
For instance, in the area of trade in services, the WTO Council on Trade in 
Services has responsibility for issuing legally non-binding interpretations of the 
GATS and its various annexes and may fulfil this function by acting upon the 
recommendations of various WTO committees that examine particular services 
sectors.  Regarding trade in financial services, the Committee on Trade in Financial 
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Services can make recommendations to the Council on Trade in Services regarding 
proposed standards and interpretations of the GATS, and any communications by 
members. 
 
Unlike the IMF and World Bank, the WTO has a horizontal decision-making 
structure based on one member one vote; all members, more or less, have equal 
procedural opportunity to influence WTO decisionmaking.  Because WTO members 
each have one vote, in theory each member has equal rights to initiate proposals and 
to participate in deliberations in the WTO committee system.  In practice, however, 
the WTO General Council makes most decisions based on consensus, and any 
disputes or objections are usually worked out in committee meetings before the 
proposal is passed up for Council consideration.  The consensus principle may only be 
set aside in certain situations where members fail to reach consensus on a particular 
issue, in which case the Ministerial Conference and General Council can render 
interpretative decisions with the approval of a three-quarter-majority vote of the WTO 
membership.   
 
The consensus principle, however, usually determines whether a specific 
proposal is successful.  Consensus is usually decided on the basis of any number of 
meetings of committees and small groups of representatives who convene, sometimes 
informally, on a more or less ad hoc basis to address particular issues of concern.  
These informal meetings have traditionally been dominated by the so-called Quad 
members – Canada, US, EU, and Japan – who take soundings on the viability of 
various proposals.  The large economically dominant members are usually best 
equipped to influence such informal negotiations to their advantage – often at the 
expense of poorer, developing countries - because they usually have better access to 
information, expertise and resources.  Moreover, it is generally understood that for 
any proposal to be approved based on consensus there must be support from the Quad 
before the proposal can be formally submitted to the relevant Trade Council and then 
on to the General Council.    
 
The operations of the WTO committee system have been criticized for being 
opaque and the selection process irregular regarding which members are invited to 
participate in particular committees.  Although each member has one vote, in practice 
the strongest economic powers exercise most influence in the operations of the 
organization.  Moreover, the consensus principle does not work effectively because 
most issues are decided in advance in the relevant committees where, it is argued, 
some countries are not invited to participate, and then later during plenary meetings of 
the General Council members who are politically less influential will be pressured by 
more powerful states to go along with what was decided.  It is argued that the opaque 
structure and lack of consistent procedures for determining which members 
participate in which committees undermines the accountability of the WTO to its 
members and subjects the poorer, weaker states to the interest of the more powerful 
states.   
 
As mentioned above, the WTO dispute settlement process allows members to 
enforce rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements.  Unlike the IMF or World 
Bank which can withdraw benefits to members (eg., restricting access to financing 
facilities), the WTO as an organization can impose no sanctions nor withhold benefits 
(with few exceptions) to members who are violating their commitments and 
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obligations under the Agreements.  The only way to hold members accountable for 
their obligations is through dispute settlement.  The DSP is regarded as an 
accountability mechanism because it allows members to vindicate their rights and to 
hold other members accountable for breaching their obligations.  This accountability 
mechanism has particular relevance in the financial regulation context because it 
allows members to challenge other members’ regulatory measures if they violate the 
GATS.  Specifically, members may use the DSP to institute proceedings against a 
country for maintaining domestic regulatory standards that are not transparent or for 
maintaining measures that may not be least restrictive in terms of their impact on 
international trade to accomplish a valid regulatory objective.   
 
The DSP, however, has been criticized on a number of grounds, as discussed 
above, particularly with respect to accountability because its ad hoc approach only 
addresses the issues raised in a particular dispute.  This process is haphazard and will 
not produce efficient or adequate international standards of financial regulation.  
Moreover, this will have a particularly pernicious impact on the economic growth 
prospects of poorer countries and may favour developed countries because if dispute 
panels rely on standards adopted by the Basel Committee and other IFIs, this will 
undermine the development of efficient economic and financial regulation for many 
countries. 
 
Also, the WTO negotiation process for liberalization commitments on market 
access and national treatment is generally benefiting richer countries which have the 
expertise and negotiating skills to agree to commitments that favour their own 
political and economic needs often at the expense of developing countries.  It should 
be added that the DSP itself is used much more by developed countries than 
developing or emerging market members because to institute DSP proceedings is 
expensive and requires specialized advice and assistance that only developed 
countries and some developing countries have the resources to afford.  This is why 
very few claims are brought by developing countries, especially against developed 
countries.  Moreover, the WTO has been criticized as lacking legitimacy because it 
adopts international rules and obligations to regulate trade which infringe the 
domestic authority of states to govern their economies (Woods & Narlikar, 2001). 
 
International Cooperation with other IFIs  
The efficient regulation of global financial markets requires that international 
organizations and standard setting bodies operate within a coherent institutional 
framework that is designed to promote cooperation and coordination of standard 
setting, implementation, and enforcement.  This involves international, regional, and 
national authorities working together and sharing jurisdictional authority over the 
supervision and regulation of the financial system as it relates to systemic risk.  The 
existing institutional structure of international financial regulation fails to achieve 
these objectives in part because there exist few formal institutional linkages that can 
facilitate the work of the global standard setting bodies with the implementation and 
enforcement efforts of regional and national authorities.  Despite the lack of progress 
in this area, international economic organisations have taken some steps toward 
improving cooperation and coordination between themselves in addressing issues that 
affect financial stability and regulation.  These efforts discussed below can provide a 
basis for further institutional reform at the international level. 
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For example, under both the GATT and GATS, the WTO has a general 
obligation to consult and accept certain IMF factual ‘findings of statistical and other 
facts . . . relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balance of payments’ 
(art XII: 5(e)).
103
  This means that in cases where the WTO is considering the 
application of a member to impose import restrictions in derogation of its existing 
commitments because of a balance of payments problem it must consult the IMF 
regarding factual issues relating to the member’s balance of payments and external 
financial situation.
104
  The WTO, however, is not required to accept the IMF’s 
interpretations or views regarding whether a country’s financial condition justifies its 
non-compliance with WTO obligations.  Rather, the WTO shall accept all statistical 
findings and other related facts on a member’s balance of payments and monetary 
reserves, and any legal determinations by the Fund regarding the consistency of a 
member’s exchange arrangements with the IMF Agreement (GATT, art. XV:2).  As 
one expert noted, the Fund’s role is to provide its expertise on balance-of-payments 
assessments, not to decide whether the WTO balance-of-payments exceptions apply 
(Siegal, 2002).   
The WTO balance of payments exceptions provide some flexibility for 
countries seeking to maintain financial stability during the liberalisation process.  The 
GATT’s experience with the balance of payments exception benefited many 
developing countries in stabilizing their economies during times of crisis or when 
there was a clear threat to financial stability.  The more lenient standard available for 
developing countries under the GATT and GATS for restricting imports recognises 
the special economic pressures they face.  This mechanism promotes legitimacy of 
standards because it allows countries to engage international organizations in 
negotiations regarding the need for special trade restrictions as they make the 
transition to liberalized economies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the application of the GATS to 
domestic financial regulation.  The GATS regime is premised on the notion that 
enhanced competition in financial services will lead to healthier financial institutions 
and improved financial products for consumers and investors (Kono et al., 1997).  It 
seeks to do this by eliminating discriminatory regulatory practices and reducing 
                                                 
103 The relevant provision in the GATS is Article XII, which requires the WTO to consult with the IMF 
regarding factual issues that concern a member’s application to depart from its commitments on MFN, 
national treatment or market access when it is having a serious balance of payments crisis or external 
financial difficulties (art XII (1)). 
104 The WTO Appellate Body has addressed two cases involving the extent of the WTO’s obligation to 
consult with the Fund regarding import restrictions taken by WTO members that were inconsistent with 
their GATT commitments.  In Argentina case, WTO members seeking to justify import restrictions 
under the GATT because they were part of an IMF economic restructuring program, and another case 
involving India maintaining import restrictions under the GATT as part of a developing country 
exception.  The Appellate Body ruled that the GATT panel did not have to take into the IMF’s 
determination regarding India’s status as a developing country.  In the Argentina case, it held that 
although Argentina had imposed certain surcharges on imports as part of a Fund restructuring program, 
the Appellate Body held that Argentina was not excused under Article XV (2) of GATT because its 
import surcharge was not an express condition of the IMF program.  Moreover, it held that the WTO 
dispute panel hearing the case had no legal obligation to consult and to take into consideration the 
factual findings of the IMF regarding Argentina’s import surcharge.   
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obstacles to cross-border trade in financial services.  Domestic regulators are 
permitted discretion to impose regulatory controls for a prudential purpose that may 
restrict cross-border trade in financial services and capital flows.  Such prudential 
regulatory controls, however, cannot be taken to avoid commitments and obligations 
under the GATS.   
 
GATS Article VI contains standards governing each member’s adoption of 
domestic regulations that apply to trade in financial services.  It also provides a 
negotiating mechanism for WTO members to develop regulatory disciplines of good 
practice that can potentially make reference to the work of other international 
economic organisations (IMF and World Bank).  The Annex on Financial Services’s 
‘prudential carve-out’ allows a member to derogate from its commitments by 
imposing regulatory measures that may restrict cross-border trade in financial services  
if such measures are taken for ‘prudential reasons’, including the ‘protection of 
depositors, investors, policyholders’, or to maintain the ‘integrity and stability of the 
financial system.’  The Agreement, however, provides little guidance concerning what 
type of regulatory measures would be GATS-compliant.  The Agreement seeks to 
remedy this in part by creating a framework that allows members to enter agreements 
recognizing the prudential regimes of other members.  Some observers claim that this 
might lead to some level of convergence or harmonization in prudential standards 
amongst members, but no such negotiations have occurred so far with little sign of 
future progress.   
 
Overall, the GATS regime provides a flexible framework for WTO members to 
negotiate liberalisation commitments while retaining national sovereignty to take 
regulatory measures that may have the effect of restricting cross-border trade in 
financial services.  At present, members have not undertaken negotiations to establish 
regulatory disciplines that could provide benchmarks against which they could 
measure the validity of their domestic regulatory measures.  Moreover, the prudential 
carve-out allows members broad discretion to adopt prudential regulatory measures 
that may have the effect of departing from GATS obligations.  Although the WTO 
Council for Trade in Services and the Committee on Trade in Financial Services are 
not presently attempting to define the ‘prudential exception’, nor are they seeking to 
establish an international standard of prudential regulation, the importance of 
determining what measures can be validly taken by WTO members to regulate 
financial markets and firms without violating GATS commitments and obligations 
principles has increasingly become a topic of trade policy concern.  The IFIs should 
take the lead in defining international standards of prudential supervision, but do so in 
a way that involves developing countries and other developed countries that have 
traditionally been left out of the standard setting process. This is necessary to avoid 
the scenario of having the WTO dispute settlement process invoked to decide on the 
validity of a state’s prudential regulatory measures. 
 
Although the WTO does not have the capacity or the mandate to set international 
standards of prudential supervision, the GATS negotiating framework allows 
members to bargain with one another on issues of national treatment and market 
access, and to do so in an informed manner that adequately promotes their economic 
development needs.  Nevertheless, liberalization of cross-border trade in financial 
services and capital flows continue to be a source of concern for financial stability 
reasons, which suggest the need for international regulatory reform.  Thus, even if 
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WTO balancing favours domestic regulation at the expense of trade, financial stability 
risks may still arise from trade-led interdependence of banking systems.  This why 
more international prudential mechanisms are needed to deal with these risks and also 
to promote trade by ensuring that so-called prudential measures are not motivated 
primarily by protective goals.   
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